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(both on the part of participating States and Mediterranean Partner States). Then the chapter will describe the OSCE's responses to the Arab Spring events. Finally, it will also look beyond the current state of the Mediterranean dimension of its work to the way forward for the OSCE's Mediterranean Partnership, including possibly more visionary ways of sharing the expertise of the OSCE with North African states.
The Mediterranean Partnership of the OSCE
This chapter will not provide a detailed account of the history of the Mediterranean partnership and the development of its structure and content. 2 Rather it will focus on the state of the relationship between the OSCE and North African states and its prospects at the time of the events of so-called Arab Spring of 2011.
The intertwining of security in Europe and the Mediterranean region has been underscored in numerous subsequent CSCE/OSCE documents (starting with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), as well as in seminars and meetings, which have addressed the Mediterranean dimension of security. Nevertheless, the substance of that relationship has only been emerging on a step-by-step basis and at times painfully slowly, and continues to be one that can best be compared to an observer status for Mediterranean Partners, with some access to the working of the Organization. Several 'soul-searching' exercises on the Mediterranean dialogue did not significantly further the agenda nor did they bring any clear vision to it.
However, the last few decades have been marked by slow but steady institutional developments in relations with a number of States and that were not participating in the CSCE/OSCE, and significantly also with out-of-region frameworks and organizations. These developments allowed the OSCE to give some substance to the relationship with its Mediterranean Partners. And while it was clear that the OSCE would not be the key player in the region, its method of dialogue, augmented with support for the Mediterranean Partners, ensured that the voluntary implementation of OSCE principles was nevertheless valued.
Membership
The recognition that European and Mediterranean security are intertwined has not been matched with a desire to include states from the southern rim of the Mediterranean as participating States. Indeed, it has also not led to an effort to include all of the States from the region in question as Partners in the dialogue.
Since the inception of the dialogue, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia have been Partner States. The only addition has been Jordan in 1998. The proposal to add Jordan had been suggested by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, in 1994 . At the time, he also spoke of adding the Palestinians. In 1998, Jordan actually requested to become a Mediterranean Partner, and the OSCE participating States reached consensus on this matter.
The Palestinian Authority has also been requesting Partner State status for some time. During informal consultations that followed the application, no consensus could be reached among the participating States, and some Partner States also had doubts. Thus the process came to a halt before it was formally tabled.
3 There are currently no other pending requests by States wishing to become Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (MPCs). It is worth noting, however, that in the past, Lebanon, Syria and Libya have taken part in CSCE meetings, and that at least Libya could possibly show an interest in joining the Mediterranean dialogue of the OSCE at some stage.
However, contacts with individual Partner States in the Mediterranean have, for some years, not been the only conduit for relations with the region. In principle, the OSCE can pursue contacts with regional organizations outside of its area in the context of the UN, in particular under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and through the process of meetings and co-operation initiated by both the UN Secretary-General in 1994 The agenda includes briefings by representatives of the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), that is the Foreign Minister of the country chairing the Organization in a given year, in particular on OSCE missions and field activities. This is followed with a presentation by an OSCE official on one of the main aspects of the OSCE's activity, such as the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, or a Personal Representative of the CiO, and other briefings on specific issues of interest.
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They also participate in deliberations on European security architecture.
As far as access to the operational activities of the Organization is concerned, the OSCE Permanent Council adopted a decision providing for representatives of the MP's, on a case-by-case basis, to participate in the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights' (ODIHR) election monitoring and supervision operations, and to make short-term visits to the OSCE Missions in order to continue to take stock of the OSCE experience and to witness the comprehensive approach to the work undertaken in the field. 7 Partner States are also invited, on a voluntary basis, to second mission members to OSCE field operations. The MPC's have been encouraged to take advantage of these decisions but the response has been muted.
It is worth highlighting what could be called the 'devolution' of the dialogue to various parts of the rather decentralized Organization. Thus, increasingly, the possibilities for support and consultations from the various institutions and offices of the OSCE were highlighted. Once a topic of common interest was identified (and funding was made available), the relevant institution or office could provide expertise or organize a seminar or workshop thereon. Significantly, it was the parliamentary dimension of the dialogue that has provided the strongest impulses for the Mediterranean dialogue. While, in the past, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) did not shy away from discussing the situation in the region, including in the Middle East, the appointment of special representatives of the PA on the Mediterranean, which gives its contacts with Mediterranean and Middle East states visibility, and the new practice of holding special sessions on the Mediterranean, changed the nature of this dialogue. as minority protection and non-discrimination in the Mediterranean, terrorism and fundamentalism, democracy and human rights in the region, debates on the situation in the Middle East, but also general discussions on the state of the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue. The PA also invites parliamentarians from the Mediterranean Partner countries to join its election observation efforts. Parliamentarians from Partner states took part in election monitoring in the OSCE area, with the first such event in 2004, when the PA sent a small delegation to monitor the Algerian presidential elections at the invitation of its Foreign Minister.
10
Less successful was the OSCE's effort to involve other players, especially civil society actors, in some aspects of the Mediterranean dialogue. Some efforts have been undertaken to reach out to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Mediterranean, most recently in the form of a side-event at the 2008 annual Mediterranean seminar of the OSCE, held in Jordan.
11 However, this practice has not become a regular feature, and the experience of the workshops has not been entirely positive.
12
A further aspect of the setting up of structures for the dialogue has been related to the issue of funding the dialogue. A voluntary Partnership Fund was decided upon by the participating States in November 2007 13 after some difficult deliberations. The part of the annual budget of the organization (which, in itself, is small compared to other organizations) devoted to the Mediterranean dialogue is miniscule. In the OSCE Secretariat, the regular budget funds one professional staff member in the External Co-operation Section, who supports both the Mediterranean and the Asian dialogue, and some limited funds for the organization of the annual Mediterranean conference. All other activities are funded by voluntary contributions. The Mediterranean Partners do not pay into the annual budget, but can make voluntary or in-kind contributions (particularly by co-organizing events or activities). Their voluntary contributions, if any, have also been negligible. The Fund has been used to support a considerable number of practical activities, mostly workshops on narrower specific topics. Partner States and their region would benefit from the most. The Partner States, however, are not all equally interested in all of the aspects of security that the OSCE pursues. The topics of the Mediterranean annual conferences during the last few years bear witness to the efforts to find an adequate way of approaching this matter.
Themes
14 The emphasis on the comprehensive approach to security has allowed, for example, human dimension issues to be 'smuggled' onto the agenda.
Representatives of the Partner States occasionally recalled informally that unlike the participating States, they have not committed themselves to implementing the OSCE's 'acquis'. To encourage the Partner States to consider some of the aspects of the OSCE's commitments of interest, the participating States came up with a formulation which called for voluntary implementation. There are indeed topics on which the OSCE focuses that are of interest to Mediterranean Partner States. These are issues related to tolerance and nondiscrimination, migration and migrants' human rights, including in countries of destination, water management, desertification, anti-terrorism measures and some related topics. The Partner States closely follow the discussions and activities in these areas and occasionally suggest workshops in order to learn more about them. However, it would be difficult to claim that they implement OSCE commitments in these areas. Not surprisingly, there are fields which have been difficult or almost impossible to place on the agenda, such as human rights cases.
It is noteworthy that the dialogue with Mediterranean Partners was largely devoid of any sweeping or visionary perspectives. Ideas have been tabled, largely informally and unsuccessfully, but they have never been taken up seriously in the context of the Organization. One interesting discussion in this context was that on the creation of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), an ambitious proposal based on the CSCE model. During a 1990 CSCE meeting in Palma de Mallorca this proposal was developed by the socalled '4+5 Group', consisting of four Southern European EC member states (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and the five participants of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) with Malta as an observer. Due to a lack of consensus, a non-binding open-ended report was issued, declaring that a meeting outside the CSCE process could discuss a set of generally accepted rules and principles in the fields of stability, co-operation and the human dimension in the Mediterranean when circumstances in the area permitted. Since then, if mentioned at all, the CSCM concept has only been discussed in informal fora.
Clearly, the time has not been ripe for such proposals. Consequently the dialogue in the OSCE has focused on 'doables', on practical proposals for cooperation, and access to some categories of the OSCE's work, mostly as observers.
14 Summaries of these conferences are available on the OSCE website: http://www.osce.org/ec/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=322
The case of the Asian Partner State Afghanistan In some ways, it was the accession of Afghanistan as a Partner for Co-operation, in the context of the Asian dialogue 15 that moved the concept of Partnership forward. Three OSCE participating States border Afghanistan. In addition, a number of participating States are engaged in Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts, and have a military presence on the ground. The US has been vocal in advocating an active role for the OSCE in Afghanistan. In 2007, the OSCE responded to a request from Afghanistan to provide assistance in the field of border security, police training and combating drug trafficking, with concrete projects and training efforts, significantly on the territory of OSCE participating States and not in Afghanistan itself. The OSCE has also been involved in Afghanistan's democratic development through sending election experts.
The debate on organizing training in Afghanistan itself has been a difficult one, and as some leaked US cables from 2010 report, it reflected the Russian opposition thereto. It has not resulted in such activities being implemented out of the OSCE area, but rather in OSCE participating States. The input of the OSCE in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan has been assessed by US diplomats as miniscule but useful.
The Afghanistan debate in the OSCE and the projects under way point to some of the issues and obstacles that would most likely beset efforts to render training and project assistance to the countries of North Africa. In particular, it appears necessary to turn once again to those states that objected to activities taking place in Partner countries, in order to try to overcome this obstacle to an effective response to the 'Arab Spring'. The OSCE's response to the Arab Spring events Not a great deal can yet be said about the OSCE's response to the 'Arab Spring', as relatively little time has passed and no high-level OSCE decision-making body has met since its beginning. The next Ministerial meeting, scheduled for December 2011, may bring some movement to the matter as the Lithuanian Chairmanship of the Organization for 2011 hopes to have a declaration or a 391 decision on co-operation with Mediterranean Partners in the wake of the 'Arab Spring' included in its deliberations. However, some trends seem to be emerging, and this section will attempt to describe them.
There has been an immediate positive response, mostly voiced by the Chairmanship, the PA, the ODIHR, and the Secretary General declaring, in principle, the Organization's willingness to support transition in the OSCE's Mediterranean Partners. There have also been visits and direct contacts with the authorities of Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, intended to gauge interest and to declare the commitment of the Organization. The CiO, while visiting Tunisia in April 2011, reportedly said that the OSCE is ready to assist Tunisia during the transition period to build and consolidate democracy, 16 and specifically within the realms of 'electoral support, development of the independent media, drafting legislation, police reform, border management, travel document security and migration management'.
The 'Arab Spring' and the role which the OSCE could play have been discussed in nearly, if not all, available fora within the Organization. The effort to provide assistance is seen as having a double nature: in the words of the OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier, 'as an effective venue for dialogue and a flexible mechanism for implementation '. 17 It appears that the goal is to make full use of existing frameworks and channels in the OSCE to place the issue on the agenda rather than the creation of new ones. That also applies to procedures that have been developed while working in the past with Partner States: it seems that while calling for the OSCE to have a role in the context of the transition in North African countries, adherence to established procedures is underlined as a precondition. To summarize the procedures, they would require a clear request from an MPC, a PC decision on such assistance, and funding made available by participating States through voluntary funds. 18 The Afghanistan case provides important clues here. At the time of writing this article, despite efforts to reach out to the policy-makers in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, no request for assistance has been lodged by a Mediterranean Partner State. There is also no discussion at this stage on expanding the Mediterranean dialogue to include new partners that may benefit from assistance, such as Libya, but such a discussion can be expected, should the Libyan authorities request it. Furthermore, it has been repeatedly underlined that the issue of possible support to countries in transition in North Africa has to be seen in the context of cooperation with the UN and regional organizations. In fact, the Lithuanian Chairman-in-Office corresponded early on this matter and met with the UN Secretary-General in March and April 2011. A press release related to one of the conversations indicates that the CiO specified that 'the OSCE, including through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights which has extensive experience in providing electoral support, stands ready to share its expertise with Tunisia and Egypt in an international effort co-ordinated by the UN'. 19 This indicates that the political leadership of the Organization wishes to foresee and foreclose possible objections by some participating States, and that it is determined to avoid problems. In the past, arguments against more extensive involvement with Partner States mainly emphasized that there is still much to do in the OSCE area, that there is only limited funding available for OSCE activities, and that the OSCE should not be implementing projects on the territory of Partner States.
While the core of the call for assistance to Mediterranean Partner States has been that the OSCE could do more of what is has been doing for a considerable period of time, within established frameworks and procedures, there has been one noticeable shift, namely towards more focus on civil society and immediate needs in the human dimension, for example on sharing election observation good practices. Several smaller activities and projects have been developed and implemented in a short time.
An important development is that the Lithuanian Chairmanship proposes to adopt a decision at the next Ministerial Council meeting to be held in December 2011 in Vilnius on enhancing OSCE engagement with the Partners for Cooperation.
One of the steps towards such a possible declaration is the OSCE Mediterranean Seminar: the 2011 OSCE Mediterranean Conference held in Montenegro on 10 and 11 October focused on the topic of 'Democratic Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities in the Mediterranean region.' The PC decision on the conference indicated that its goal was to 'provide an opportunity for the Mediterranean Partners to indicate what they would like to see in a possible decision or declaration by the Vilnius Ministerial Council '. 20 For the first time, the agenda focused on specific and controversial issues such as, for example, police reform and control over the armed forces in the region. However, the attendance and input by Partner States was disappointing.
The OSCE PA has been vocal and active on the events of the 'Arab Spring'. Transition' 21 which inter alia urges the OSCE and other international organizations to become involved, and urges the Mediterranean Partners to 'solicit OSCE and OSCE PA institutional expertise in governmental reform, election facilitation, and political pluralism to facilitate peaceful regional transition' and to 'consult OSCE and OSCE PA institutional resources on management of peaceful assembly, press freedom, and civil society capacity development'. It also urges OSCE participating States to contribute to the Partnership Fund and also to support a civil society forum to be held during the 2012 OSCE Mediterranean Conference. In October 2011 the OSCE PA Mediterranean Forum also focused on events in North Africa. Most importantly, however, the PA also took practical steps and observed the elections in Tunisia in October 2011. This was done at the invitation of the Tunisian authorities, with some 80 parliamentarian members of the OSCE PA participating, over a period of several days. Pre-visits by the OSCE PA leadership, including Vice President Ricardo Migliori, have taken place. The PA has been outspoken concerning the events in North Africa, including condemning the loss of lives, and suggesting that the OSCE should take a more proactive stance on providing assistance to Partner States in the wake of the Arab Spring.
Following the events of early 2011 in North Africa, the Director of ODIHR, Ambassador Janez Lenarcic, stated pertinently that 'recent events point to the fact that 'cultural specifics' cannot justify the sustained closing of political space for discourse, unaccountable government, repression and torture.
[…] (P)eople all over the world desire the same thing -freedom, justice, dignity, and a say in the way their lives are governed '. 22 According to its Director, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) can assist with its expertise in seven areas: elections; political party legislation; independence of the judiciary; national human rights institutions; human rights and combating terrorism; hate crimes; and facilitating participation in OSCE meeting.
23 ODIHR also began practical support efforts by offering a three-day Human Rights and election monitoring workshop in Warsaw in July 2011, designed for civil society participants from Egypt. Furthermore, a joint OSCE-Mediterranean Partner Countries' Conference for Civil Society is to take place in Vilnius in December 2011, and is organized by the Lithuanian Chairmanship and ODIHR. The OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting of September 2011, organized by ODIHR, featured events in North Africa rather prominently. The ODIHR Director, Ambassador Janez Lenarcic, referred to the developments in the Southern Mediterranean as one of the key developments in human rights over the last year: 'OSCE cannot stay aside from the momentous happenings in our Partner countries. The importance of a stable and prosperous neighbourhood is enshrined in numerous OSCE documents. … I see that there is a role for the OSCE to share its experience and good practices. Supporting our partner countries in their current endavours is not only desired, but necessary. … I am in no way arguing that OSCE's attention should deviate to another geographic area. Things remain to be done within our participating States. There is enough will and means to do both '. 25 There have also been some developments linked to the work of the OSCE Secretariat, now headed by the newly appointed OSCE Secretary General, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, who also accorded priority to the possible OSCE support to Tunisia and Egypt in his speeches and schedule. 26 These developments included inter alia short-term placements for nationals of Partner States in the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network.
Membership
Little has been said in the OSCE on the possibility of accepting new Partner States in the wake of the 'Arab Spring', and in particular no discussion has so far taken place on the possibility of admitting Libya as one such Partner state. This may not be surprising, as the matter of expanding the dialogue is marked by the pending application of Palestine. Furthermore, little discussion can be expected in the absence of clear requests. Finally, the discussion in the OSCE has so far mainly been focused on Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, the above-mentioned ambition of Mongolia to move beyond Partner Status and to become a participating State may affect the dynamics on this issue.
However, it is worth mentioning that more attention has been paid, at a declaratory level, to co-operation with regional organizations in adjacent regions, and in particular in North Africa. The need to co-operate with the Arab League in particular has been underlined by the CiO 
Structure
So far, there have also not been any substantial changes to or proposals to change the existing structure of the dialogue. In fact, it appears that the key focus is on utilizing the existing frameworks and structures to their fullest. Thus, the issue of co-operation with Partner states in the wake of the 'Arab Spring' has been tabled within the entire scope of for a which are open to Mediterranean Partner States in the context of the OSCE, including regular and special events as described above. But the key issue at this stage is that Mediterranean Partner States are unable or unwilling to set the agenda and/or clearly request assistance from the OSCE, whether due to the very changing political environment, personnel changes (also in their delegations to the OSCE), or the desire to do as much as possible on their own.
Themes
Like most international, and especially intergovernmental, frameworks which are active in the Mediterranean region, the OSCE to some degree failed in the past to focus appropriately on issues related to human rights and democratization in its dialogue. It is of course evident that the OSCE had little in terms of carrots and sticks to do so, especially since the Partner States did not subscribe to its principles nor joined the Organization. It has rather chosen to, whenever possible, place on the agenda the comprehensive approach to security which allowed it to raise inter alia the human dimension, and to look for areas of cooperation which were of interest to both sides. That meant that specific human rights criticisms were difficult to add to the agenda. Little more could be expected of an Organization with such a profile. Arguably, even concerning its participating States, which have subscribed to the OSCE acquis communitaire, it was at times an uphill battle to address the human rights failures of governments on the agenda in a constructive way, and some of the participating States very much objected to such procedures in general, and/or specifically when it pertained to their own problems.
The 'Arab Spring' has generally highlighted the universality of human rights and the need to place them more adequately on the agenda of frameworks that co-operate with the countries of North Africa. This also applies to the OSCE, and has been underlined, for example, in the interventions by the Director of ODIHR.
The way forward in the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue
The OSCE is in principle quite well prepared to provide some assistance to its Mediterranean Partners that are experiencing transition processes following the 'Arab Spring'. The first projects and activities -the PA's election observation in Tunisia and the ODIHR workshops involving civil society on the subject of election observation -point in the right direction, although they also indicate that this will not be a massive engagement, but rather one which is in keeping with the previous profile of the OSCE's Mediterranean Dialogue. The Afghanistan 396 case, discussed above, provides an insight into both the possibilities and limitations of the OSCE in providing assistance to Partner states, although it is likely that some negotiations will take place to enlarge the scope of possibilities.
However, the OSCE is yet to either be confronted with or address some of the difficult issues and questions that are likely to arise in the context of its Mediterranean Partnership following the 'Arab Spring'. These relate, first and foremost, to who is in and who is out of the dialogue. The issue of Palestine's application is pending and is not likely to go away, as the experience of the UN efforts concerning the Palestinians indicate. First of all, there will be the question of whether to encourage Libya's new authorities to apply to become a Partner and, of course, whether to accept the country as one. There will be issues related to Israel's role or standing (and possibly isolation) in the Mediterranean dialogue, in particular if it is to be enlarged to include other Arab states. There will be tensions between the needs and willingness to engage of Partner countries that have implemented far-reaching reforms and those that have not. Consequently, there may also be tensions linked to the OSCE's work with civil societies, and on human dimension issues. Thus, the regional approach that the OSCE tried to implement will be difficult to follow. There will also be setbacks for the Mediterranean dialogue if the political reform in one or more of the Partner countries collapses.
It will be interesting to see whether the OSCE participating States succeed in negotiating a meaningful declaration on co-operation with Mediterranean Partners at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting. But given the current emphasis on doing more within established frameworks, with established procedures, and with current Partners, it would be rather surprising if the declaration put forward a far-reaching vision of the way forward in the Mediterranean Dialogue. Nevertheless, it would be possible to acknowledge in such a declaration the general support for democratization processes in North Africa, to underline the need to pursue a comprehensive understanding of security, to point to the need to work with parliamentarians and civil society, and once again to propose support for those Mediterranean Partner States that will embark upon the process of the voluntary implementation of OSCE principles and commitments. It could also highlight co-operation between the OSCE and existing regional frameworks such as the League of Arab States. Furthermore, the declaration could also call upon participating States to support the Partnership Fund.
What in the current situation is unlikely to find its way into a possible declaration would be more far-reaching concepts such as enlarging the OSCE to include new participating States from among the Mediterranean Partner States (which would thus subscribe to the OSCE commitments); or support for the creation of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) or a CSCM-like structure with the OSCE as an example or a mentor.
Conclusion
The input which the OSCE could provide for the democratization processes in
The OSCE contribution to democratization in North African countries Security and Human Rights 2011 no. 4 397 North Africa should not be overlooked -in a dialogue mode, with no strings or preconditions attached, focusing on interesting the Mediterranean Partner States in its acquis and explaining the functioning of a co-operative security framework with a comprehensive understanding of security -and it certainly has a role to play in the region. Although the experience of working through a regional, inclusive and comprehensive organization, based on consensus and the understanding that states are accountable to each other and to their citizens may not have a visible and immediate impact, it is surely worthwhile pursuing.
However, while the leadership of the Organization has found the right words to indicate the willingness and the interest of the Organization in providing assistance to its Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, in particular to Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, there seems to be also a preference among the participating States to move slowly and along established parameters on this matter. The existing decision-making and financial procedures and operational limitations on engaging on the ground in those countries would not allow for a quick and decisive response. In the mid-term, much will depend on whether the Partner States can formulate realistic requests to the OSCE, as organizational change tends to be driven by actual demands.
In the longer term, the development of the Mediterranean dialogue will largely depend on several factors. The first will be whether the OSCE will be able to spread the word concerning its profile, experience and the assistance it could provide, not only to the delegations of Partner States in Vienna, but also to other players, both governmental and non-governmental. The second will be whether participating States will be able to find consensus on activities in support of democratization and transition processes in North Africa taking place in Partner States (rather than in one of the participating States, as is currently the case). The third factor is whether Partner States will at all be open to working with international and regional organizations in general and the OSCE in particular on democratization and transition process. There appears to be a certain amount of hesitation for domestic reasons. The fourth factor is in how far other, larger and wealthier players, such as the EU, will be interested and motivated to co-operate with the OSCE in North Africa. And, finally, the way forward will also depend on whether the various stakeholders are able to develop more visionary approaches to security in the region.
Ideally, the OSCE will move cautiously in response to clear demands and in agreement with players such as the EU, but in proactive and visible ways. This response should be quick concerning some issues (such as elections) while, with regard to other issues, the response should be willing to see assistance as a longterm project (such as civil society support or civilian control of the military). And, ultimately, this response should be based on a vision of the OSCE's role in the Mediterranean region, and beyond.
